Vietnam courting major powers

BY DAVID KOH


IN THE past five years, Vietnam has been courting all major economic and political centres of the world, including the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

In the middle of last month, there was a flurry of diplomatic activities, when its three top political leaders visited or received guests of importance. German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Hanoi, while State President Truong Tan Sang visited India. These visits followed one to Vietnam by Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard in March. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung also visited Japan this month.

However, the visit that was most eagerly awaited was Vietnam Communist Party boss Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to China in mid-October. But the visit showed that all was not well between the two countries.

The trip to China was Mr Trong’s second overseas visit after he became the country’s top politician. In May, Chinese Maritime Administration ships had cut a cable of Vietnamese ship Binh Minh 02 conducting oil exploration activity.

During the visit Mr Trong met all the top Chinese politicians. The highlight of the visit was an agreement reached between the two sides on how to resolve the bilateral disputes over the South China Sea.

Both sides made some concessions. For instance, the first clause of their joint declaration reiterated the Chinese stand that both sides should consider “the big picture” – overall bilateral relations, the regional situation and their traditional friendship – when dealing with South China Sea issues.

On its part, Vietnam made China put ink on paper to discuss bilateral maritime disputes with Vietnam, including those in the Gulf of Tonkin, in accordance with the 1982 Law of the Sea, historical claims, as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea. However, the text did not state clearly whether disputes involving third parties need multilateral negotiations (the Chinese said no, the Vietnamese said yes).

Both countries also agreed to have bi-annual high-level meetings to discuss bilateral hot issues. A hotline will be established to deal with emergency matters on the seas.

Such an agreement hardly means Sino-Vietnamese tensions will go away. And the agreement still needs to be verified by actual conduct.

This is probably the Vietnamese view as well and so Vietnam has been earnestly courting other major powers, including those that have cards to play against China.

The visit to India by State President Sang is a statement about India’s impor tance to Vietnam’s strategic calculations. India is the major power on Vietnam’s western maritime flank and a possible counterweight to the influence of other major powers.

The most important outcome of the visit was the bilateral agreement to invite India to prospect for oil on Vietnam’s continental shelf. This came as a shock to Chinese commentators, who demanded India’s immediate withdrawal.

Truth be told, Vietnamese-Indian intentions were already known to Chinese officials as long as four years ago. Officially, China warned India the drillings were illegal, but India disregarded it, given its view that the area drilled was “within Vietnamese territory”. India has had an oil presence in the South China Sea since the early 1990s.

The high-profile visit by the German Chancellor to Hanoi confirmed the historical friendship between the two countries, and at the same time marked a new vigour in their cooperation.

Germany has received hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese students and workers in the past four decades, and currently there are 4,000 Vietnamese students in Germany. There are also more than 100,000 Vietnamese immigrants in Germany, including a second-generation Vietnamese who has become a government minister. Bilateral trade with Germany stood at US$6 billion (S$7.6 billion) last year – less than that with the United States and China, but more than trade with India.

More importantly, a Vietnam-Germany Strategic Partnership was signed that would greatly increase German offers of scholarships, training of nurses, and environment and climate change capabilities in Vietnam. Germany took the opportunity to announce it would offer US$400 million in overseas development aid help to Vietnam next year.

PM Dung, who received Dr Merkel, said “the strategic partnership would contribute to peace, cooperation and development to the region and to the world”. This statement appears to be a subtle message signalling a Vietnamese wish to expand Germany’s role in South-east Asia.

In the end, the Vietnamese strategy is basically threefold. At the core is its relationship with major powers that are also neighbours. Asean is the next layer providing a cover of regionalism and community. The outermost layer is engagement with major powers that make up the gaps of the first two.

This strategy is carefully thought out and is different from the big power strategy Vietnam adopted during the Cold War. It is a recognition of the preeminent status of China in the region, but it also contains enough insurance to ensure that Hanoi’s respect for China is reciprocated.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.